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In this letter we show that the variation of the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption
scheme as introduced in [1] is not secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
This removes the putative main advantage of the scheme.
Introduction: In [1] a new public-key encryption scheme was proposed. It is a (sim-
pler) variation of the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme as proposed in [2].
The Cramer-Shoup scheme has as main advantage that it is provable secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, under the assumption that the Diffie-Hellman
decision problem [2] is intractable. It was the first scheme that was proven to be re-
sistant in this way, as well as being practically implementable. The scheme of [1] has
a lower computationally complexity than the Cramer-Shoup scheme. Besides that,
it is also claimed to resist adaptive chosen plaintext attacks. This would make this
scheme preferable to the Cramer-Shoup scheme. In this letter however we disprove
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2the provable security-claim by presenting an adaptive chosen plaintext attack.
Adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks: In an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack an ad-
versary tries to decrypt a given ciphertext c (corresponding to a plaintext m). Fur-
thermore in this scenario the adversary is able to obtain the decryption of a number
of ciphertexts of his choice (except for c); these choices may be made with knowl-
edge of c. With aid of these decryptions he tries to obtain (information about) m.
The adaptive chosen ciphertext attack is a common setting for attacks on public-key
encryption systems.
Security against adaptive chosen plaintexts is equivalent with non-malleability [4].
In this scenario the adversary has knowledge of the encryption c of m and can obtain
decryptions of his choice as well. But here his goal is to encrypt another message m′,
related to m. In [1] non-malleability is proven under the sole assumption that the
only known relationship between m and m′ is m′ = m+ 1. We will present an attack
on this scheme for m′ = γ · m, where γ ∈ G.
Description of the scheme: The scheme under attack is described as follows.
Let G be a group of prime order p for which the discrete logarithm problem is
intractable and let g be a generator of G. The private key is given by a pair x, y ∈ G,
only known to the user. The public key is derived as (w1, w2) = (g
x, gy). Furthermore
let H∗ be a family of collision resistant hash functions.
Encryption of a message m ∈ G goes as follows. First select uniformly at random
an r ∈ G and a hash function h ∈ H∗. Note that h is revealed for decryption, but r is
not. Then compute u = gr, v = m · wr
1
, α = h(u, v) and β = wα
1
· wr
2
. The ciphertext
Appeared in Electronics Letters 36(1), 32 pages, 2000.
c©2000 IEE
3is given by the triple (u, v, β).
For decryption one has the following algorithm. First α = h(u, v) is computed.
Then it is verified whether β = wα
1
· uy holds. If it does not hold, the algorithm
outputs ‘reject’, otherwise the ciphertext is said to be valid and the algorithm outputs
the decrypted message m = v · u−x.
The attack: We prove that for any given encryption of a message m, an adversary
can obtain the encryption of γ · m for any γ ∈ G. This implies that the scheme is
malleable and hence not resistant against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
Let the encryption (u, v, β) of the message m be known. Then the adversary can
encrypt m′ = γ · m for any value of γ ∈ G in the following way. First set r′ = r and
h′ = h. Note that we do not need to know the value of r to proceed. Now it follows
that u′ = gr
′
= gr = u. Further calculate v′ = m′ ·wr
′
1
= γ ·m ·wr
1
= γ ·v, α′ = h(u′, v′)
and β′ = wα
′
1
· wr
′
2
= wα
′
1
· β · w−α1 to get the ciphertext triple (u
′, v′, β′).
The ciphertext is valid, since β ′ = wα
′
1
·β ·w−α1 = w
α
′
1
·wα
1
·uy ·w−α1 = w
α
′
1
·uy = wα
′
1
·
(u′)y. Hence, the decryption algorithm will output v′ · (u′)−x = v ·γ ·u−x = γ ·m = m′.
This implies that the scheme is malleable. Furthermore, an adaptive chosen plain-
text attack can be mounted by constructing the encryption of 2m with the above
method and then obtaining its decryption. Then m can be calculated from the now
obtained value 2m.
Conclusions: In this letter we have demonstrated an adaptive chosen ciphertext at-
tack against the variation of Cramer-Shoup’s public-key encryption scheme as pro-
posed in [1].
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